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Volume 11 Summer 1978 Number 2
ANTITRUST CONFLICTS BETWEEN
FRIENDS: CANADA AND THE UNITED
STATES IN THE MID-1970'S
Donald Z Bakert
These are times of turmoil. Serious conflicts exist between Canada and
the United States over where and how American antitrust laws are to be
enforced.' In fact, the conflict is broader than just that between Canada and
the United States: quite similar conflicts exist today between the United
States and the other common law nations, including Britain and Australia.
2
This is definitely discouraging.
What is encouraging is that we are able to hold a rational dialogue
about these conflicts and their causes.3 I am happily freed of the constraints
t Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. A.B. 1957, Princeton University; B.A. in Law
1959, Cambridge University; LL.B. 1961, Harvard Law School. From August 1976 to May
1977 the author served as Assistant Attorney General in Charge of the Antitrust Division, U.S.
Department of Justice.
1. The most recent example is the current uranium dispute. See Re Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273 (High Ct. Justice 1977). See generallynotes 118-
39 infra and accompanying text.
2. Seenotes 104-13 infra and accompanying text.
3. For another view on some of the issues dealt with in this Article, see Stanford, The
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of public office, and yet not wholly freed from what I learned through the
challenging experience of holding office. Some of my views may seem out-
rageous to some people in Canada. Other views may seem equally outra-
geous to some people in the United States. So be it. I believe in the honest
exchange of possibly outrageous ideas-for sometimes, through the process,
we can find a new truth that may still seem outrageous to political apolo-
gists and other custodians of conventional wisdom.
These conflicts with which we deal are phrased in dry lawyers' con-
cepts: "jurisdiction," "extraterritoriality," "comity," "Crown privilege," and
so forth. But they go much deeper. They reflect differences in national poli-
cies, priorities, politics, and unspoken assumptions. To make progress, we
must go behind the lawyers' phrases to the broader realities. Let me take the
first step in this direction. I shall start with the United States and then turn
to Canada.
THE AMERICAN REALITY
Americans have many frontier virtues and at least some frontier faults.
We still have a strong sense of the worth of individual effort and the value
of individual liberty. As a people, Americans have a solid distrust of gov-
ernment, a deep lack of respect for those in authority. The Bert Lance affair
is one of the most recent manifestations of this phenomenon.4
U.S. antitrust law embodies these values. It reflects a feeling that the
consumer will be better served if businesses have to hustle to survive. In
other words, as consumers, Americans would generally rather rely on the
impersonal market than on a paternalistic government for protection.5 But
antitrust law goes deeper. It embodies a populist suspicion of the big and
distant enterprise and tries to curb or break up visible private economic
power.6 The Sherman Act,7 therefore, is not a few dusty pages buried in our
Application of the Sherman Act to Conduct Outside the United States: A Viewfrom Abroad, 11
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 195 (1978).
4. See generallyHorrock, Variety of Charges Caused Bert Lance's Decline and Fall, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 22, 1977, at 17, col. 1.
5. In Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), Mr. Justice Black wrote:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the
premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allo-
cation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic political and social institutions.
Id at 4.
6. In his landmark opinion in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1948), Judge Learned Hand stressed that, by enacting the Sherman Act, Congress
"was not necessarily actuated by economic motives alone. It is possible, because of its indirect
social or moral effect, to prefer a system of small producers, each dependent for his success
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law libraries but, as the Supreme Court put it, "the Magna Carta of free
enterprise" in the United States.8 High school history students read about
Senator Sherman, Standard Oil, and the robber barons. Congress may not
have been too sure of what it was doing in 1890,9 but what it did has taken
on an almost constitutional quality.10 Price fixing, cartels, and the like are
front page evils in the American environment.
Today, antitrust policies and enforcement are riding a particularly
strong wave of public support. Politicians, encouraged by the press and
public, have sharpened the antitrust weapons greatly in the past five years.
First, U.S. antitrust enforcement budgets-already large by the standards of
most industrial countries-have been increased about 40 percent in
constant dollars, and almost 100 percent in inflated dollars.1 ' Second,
broad new investigational tools have been created to aid the enforcement
agencies. 12 Third, state attorneys general have been authorized to bring
treble damage class actions on behalf of injured consumers.13 Fourth, maxi-
mum antitrust jail sentences have been tripled, and maximum corporate
fines have been increased twentyfold. 14 And fifth, resale price maintenance
upon his own skill and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must accept
the direction of a few." Id at 427. The Supreme Court made the same point in its first decision
under § 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended in 1950: "[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress'
desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned busi-
nesses. Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the
maintenance of fragmented industries and markets. It resolved these competing considerations
in favor of decentralization." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1976).
8. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
9. SeeW. LETWIN, LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA 16 (1965); H. THORELLI,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 225-32 (1954); Letwin, The English Common Law Concern-
ing Monopolies, 21 U. CHI. L. RFv. 355, 384-85 (1954).
10. Both the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-8 (1976), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27, 44, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1976), speak in general terms. Their language does not mandate
answers to close questions. Rather, these antitrust laws embody a broad commitment to com-
petition as the fundamental economic regulator, but leave room for shifts in the nature of the
commitment over time. Chief Justice Hughes made this point in his opinion in Appalachian
Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), a case that was first a shift, and then an
aberration, in antitrust enforcement: "As a charter of freedom, the [Sherman] Act has a gener-
ality and adaptability comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional provisions."
Id at 359-60.
11. U.S. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, THE BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT 307 (1978); id at 346 (1973). The total personnel of the U.S. antitrust enforce-
ment agencies increased about 50 percent during the last decade. See Oversight ofAntitrust
Enforcement- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly ofthe Senate Comm on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 333 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Oversight of Antitrust
Enforcement] (statement of Assistant Attorney General Donald I. Baker).
12. SeeHart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, tits. I,
II, 90 Stat. 1383 (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1976)).
13. Id tit. III (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c-15h (1976)).
14. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 15, 47, 49 U.S.C.).
1978]
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has been repealed. 15 The American political momentum is plainly for
more, and tougher, antitrust enforcement.' 6 Antitrust enforcers are con-
stantly asked why they are not doing more to break up OPEC, to eliminate
the Arab boycott of Israel, to bring down energy costs, and so forth.
Americans are also afflicted with what might be called the sunshine
ethic. As a people, we thoroughly distrust public officials, especially when
they make vague claims about national security, public safety, or the gen-
eral good. We aspire, in the celebrated phrase of the Massachusetts Decla-
ration of Rights, to have "a government of laws and not of men."' 7
Americans want government carried out through formal rules and orders,
and want it carried on in the open. Thomas Jefferson once said if he had to
choose between government without newspapers and newspapers without
government, he would choose the latter.' 8 This bias lingers on. Thus we
vindicate the right of the press to print whatever it has, while narrowly lim-
iting the right of government to claim confidentiality on what it has. Illus-
trative of this tradition are the Pentagon Papers case, 19 where the Supreme
Court flatly rejected the Government's firm assertion of "national security"
as a ground for withholding public disclosure,20 and the uniquely captioned
case, United States v. Nixon, President of the United States,21 in which the
Supreme Court unanimously rejected the right of our highest elected offi-
cial to use a broad "executive privilege" to withhold documents subpoe-
naed by the special prosecutor.22 It was for the courts, not the President, to
determine the privilege question.23
The American sunshine tradition goes much beyond the few celebrated
cases. The Freedom of Information Act24 allows members of the public to
obtain access to nearly all internal government documents.25 Congress has
just reemphasized the point by passing the Government in the Sunshine
15. Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801 (amending 15
U.S.C. §§ 1, 45(a) (1976)).
16. See Oversight of Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 11, at 1-8 (statements of Senators
Kennedy, Laxalt, and Metzenbaum).
17. Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XXX.
18. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Colonel Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), reprinted
in 4 THE WRITINGS OF THoMAs JEFFERSON 357, 360 (P. Ford ed. 1894).
19. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
20."Both the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press
must be left free to publish news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior
restraints." 1d at 717 (Black, J., concurring). "Secrecy in government is fundamentally anti-
democratic, perpetuating bureaucratic errors. Open debate and discussion of public issues are
vital to our national health. On public questions there should be 'uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open' debate." Id at 724 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,-376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964)).
21. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
22. Id at 707-13.
23. Id at 703-05.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
25. Id § 552(a)(2)-(3), (b).
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Act,26 which requires various government agencies to hold virtually all
their deliberations in public.27 This means, for example, that three members
of the five-member Civil Aeronautics Board cannot legally hold an infor-
mal discussion among themselves on a question of airline policy!28
Whether all of this emphasis on open markets and open government is
wise is not the issue.29 What is important is that these American values be
recognized as real and deeply held.
II
THE CANADIAN REALITY
I like to think that I look at Canada from the perspective of a friend
and admirer. I certainly do so with sympathy for the problems of maintain-
ing peace, order, and good government among diverse people sparsely
spaced across a vast continent and in the shadow of a large and energetic
neighbor.
I am struck by how much of what has happened in Canada has been in
reaction to less than wholly pleasant developments in the United States.
Much of the settlement in the Maritime Provinces was a reaction to the
American Revolution. Much of the spirit of the Charlottetown Conference
was a reaction to the horrors of the American Civil War: those there wanted
what they thought was a strong form of federal government because they
saw great dangers in weakness at the center of a vast federation.
In the 20th century, and particularly in the last couple of decades,
Canadians have reacted to the huge American role in their economy in a
variety of ways. This is reflected in Canada's regulation of foreign invest-
ment 3° and in its attempts to make foreign-owned enterprises behave as if
26. Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 39 U.S.C.).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976). The Act provides that "every portion of every meeting of an
agency shall be open to public observation." Id § 552b(b). Subsection (c) sets forth a narrow
list of exceptions.
28. SeeS U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2), (b) (1976); 49 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (1976).
29. I have questioned its wisdom before. SeeBaker, Anitrust in the Sunshine, 21 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 347, 351-53 (1977).
30. The restrictions on nonresident ownership of Canadian industry were prompted by the
sharp increase in direct foreign investment following the Second World War. By 1953, nonresi-
dents had contributed 50 percent of the equity and debt capital invested in Canadian manu-
facturing and 57 percent of that employed in mining-a dramatic rise from the 1926 figures of
35 percent and 38 percent respectively. DOMINION BUREAU OF STATISTICS, CANADA'S INTER-
NATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION 1926-1954, at 35 (1956). The "Gray Report" stated that, as
of 1967, nonresidents owned 58 percent of the assets of Canadian manufacturing companies
and almost 63 percent of the assets of Canadian mining concerns. Gov'T OF CANADA, FOR-
EIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA 21 (1972). SeeJ. DICKEY, CANADA AND THE AMERI-
CAN PRESENCE (1975). Canada's regulation of foreign investment in the financial industry is
particularly restrictive: nonresidents may not own more than 25 percent of the stock of any
Canadian bank, life insurance, trust, or loan company. Bank Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. B-1, §
75(2)(g) (1970); Canadian and British Insurance Companies Act, id c. 1-15, § 19 (1)-(2) (1970);
1978]
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they were purely citizens of Canada, rather than outposts in some overseas
commercial empire.3 1 Canadians seem to have a more charitable view of
government than do Americans. The Canadian Government is directly in-
volved in the sensitive activities that Americans keep the government out of
in the United States. For example, in Canada the Government plays a key
role in the broadcasting field 32 -and does quite a good job indeed-while
in the United States broadcasting is almost wholly relegated to the private
sector33 -with what often seems a sacrifice of program quality in the search
for commercial advertising revenues. Similarly the Canadian Government
does much more in energy and transportation than its American counter-
part.34
The Canadian public's greater confidence in government is reflected in
a wholly different approach to government secrecy. The Official Secrets
Act,35 following the British tradition,36 has a breadth and scope that is hard
for Americans to appreciate.37 Crown privilege has a reach unfamiliar to
Americans. 38 And the courts seem much less involved as an outside check
Trust Companies Act, id c. T-16, § 38(l)-(2) (1970); Loan Companies Act, id c. L-12, § 45(1)-
(2) (1970). See generally Arnold, Restrictions on Foregn Investment in Canadian Financial
Institutions, 20 U. TORONTO L.J. 196 (1970); Comment, Foreign Investment Restrictions: De-
fending Economic Sovereignty in Canada and Australia, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 345 (1973).
31. See, for example, Canada's actions in the uranium controversy, notes 104-13 infra, and
Canada's regulation of the petroleum industry, Thompson, Sovereignty and Natural Re-
sources-4 Study of Canadian Petroleum Legislation, I VAL. L. REV. 284 (1967).
32. Beke, Government Regulation of Broadcasting in Canada, 36 SASK. L. REV. 39, 41
(1971).
33. See id
34. For example, over one-half of Canada's railway mileage and its larger national and
international airlines are owned by the government. Pickersgill, Evolving a New Policy in Ca-
nadian Transportation, 36 ICC PRAc. J. 1949, 1950 (1969) (address by the President of the
Canadian Transportation Commission).
35. CAN. Rv. STAT. c. 0-3 (1970), as amended by Protection of Privacy Act, [1973-74]
Can. Stat. c. 50, §§ 5-6 (1974).
36. See, e.g., Official Secrets Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 28, as amendedby Official Secrets
Act, 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. 5, c. 75.
37. See, e.g., Official Secrets Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 0-3, § 3(1) (1970) (making it a crime
for any person, for any purpose prejudicial to the interests of the State, to approach or be in
the neighborhood of a prohibited place); id § 3(2) (conviction may be obtained "if, from the
circumstances of the case... it appears that [the defendant's] purpose was a purpose prejudi-
cial to the safety or interests of the State"); id § 11(2) (search warrant may be obtained without
prior judicial approval in cases of "great emergency"); id § 14(2) (public may be excluded
from trials).
38. Section 41 of the Federal Court Act of Canada, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 10, § 41 (2d Supp.
1972), codified in part the prior common law of Crown privilege. Cf Bradley v. McIntosh, 5
Ont. 227 (C.P. Div. 1884) (application of prior common law privilege). Section 41(2) provides:
When a Minister of the Crown certifies to any court by affidavit that the production
or discovery of a dodument or its contents would be injurious to international rela-
tions, national defence or security, or to federal-provincial relations, or that it would
disclose a confidence of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, discovery and produc-
tion shall be refused without any examination of the document by the court.
CAN. REv. STAT. c. 10, § 41(2) (2d Supp. 1972). The Canadian court in the Westinghouse
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on executive discretion.
Nothing in Canada seems to correspond in strength and breadth to the
Jeffersonian populist tradition that assumes "bigness is badness" in the pri-
vate sector.39 Thus, to take a striking example, Canada has a nationwide
commercial banking system dominated by a handful of very large banks.40
The United States has a balkanized banking system which confines the op-
erations of any bank to the borders of the specific state4 '-with the interest-
ing result that some of the largest American banks, fenced in at home, do at
least half their business abroad.42 The Canadian tradition seems to be more
of government oversight and control of private economic power, rather
than the more structural approach that characterizes many antitrust and
other public policies in the United States.
In sum, antitrust in Canada is much more of a minority taste-a tech-
nical legal matter-for a small group of specialists. Accordingly, the Com-
bines Investigations Act43 is more limited in its terms than the American
antitrust statutes and has been enforced in a much more limited way.
litigation, seenotes 118-39 infraand accompanying text, applied the Crown privilege to block
the discovery of government documents relating to uranium production and marketing. Re
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. & Duquesne Light Co., 16 Ont. 2d 273 (High Ct. Justice 1977).
Where government assertion of the Canadian Crown privilege is prompted by a private
party, it would be appropriate for the court to invoke the Interstate Circuit evidentiary pre-
sumption that the evidence would be unfavorable to the defendants. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v.
United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
39. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 25, 272 (1974); note 6 supra
40. SeeBank Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. B-i (1970), as amended. As of 1960, over 90 percent
of the Canadian banking industry's assets were held by five of the nine Canadian banks.
Baum, Banking in Canada, 59 Gao. L.J. 1127, 1127 & n.1 (1971). The Bank Act, [1966-67]
Can. Stat. c. 87, § 75 (1967) (codified in CAN. REV. STAT. c. B-1, § 75 (1970)), granted present
members of the industry a limited monopoly, thus assuring that this concentration of power
would be maintained.
41. 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(c), 1842 (1976). Several banks and holding companies, however, enjoy
"grandfather" rights to conduct certain interstate operations. All national banks are also sub-
ject to state banking laws, which further limit the industry's geographic operations. 12 U.S.C. §
36(c)(1)-(2) (1976); cf First Nat'l Bank of Logan v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 385 U.S. 252,
rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1032 (1966) (Comptroller of the Currency may not authorize na-
tional banks to establish branches that violate state law). Only 17 states allow unlimited
branching, 21 permit branching in limited areas, and 11 prohibit all branch operations. (Wyo-
ming has no state branch banking law.) 1 FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 3106 (1978). See
also Baker, Bank Expansion: Geographic Barriers, 91 BANKING L.J. 707 (1974).
42. See BANKAMERICA CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 1976, at 44 (1977) (67 percent of total
after-tax earnings for 1976 from foreign operations); CHASE MANHATTAN CoR., ANNUAL
REPORT 1976, at 30 (1977) (53 percent); CITICORP, ANNUAL REPORT 1976, at 20 (1977) (72
percent); MANUFACTURERs-HANOVER Colp., ANNUAL REPORT 1976, at 28 (1977) (48 per-
cent).
43. CAN. REv. STAT. c. C-23 (1970), as amended.
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III
THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION AND REALITY
These underlying political realities have much to do with today's 'ju-
risdictionar' conflicts. We have to be practical rather than ideological.
There is of course a broader reality: our age of modem technology and
industrialization makes our lives much more interdependent than our
grandparents would have dreamed possible. I can sit at home in upstate
New York drinking Canadian beer and listening to Canadian radio. I can
even have my lights go out, as happened in 1965, because a piece of electri-
cal equipment failed in Ontario, producing a cascade of confusion through
our highly interconnected electric power systemsf.4 Canadian air may be
polluted by some activity not too far from where I live.45 In today's world,
something can physically occur in Canada that has a primary effect in the
United States; something can physically occur in the United States that may
have its primary effect in Canada. For example, if I set up a powerful trans-
mitter and started broadcasting from my hilltop in Ithaca, New York, on a
frequency assigned to the CBC station in Toronto, the immediate physical
act would be in New York State, but the primary effect would be in Ontario
where most of the listeners on that frequency live. Or, if someone standing
on the waterfront at Windsor fired a rifle across the Detroit River, the phys-
ical act of firing would occur in Ontario, but the primary impact would
occur in Michigan. These are simple examples because they deal with ef-
fects that a physicist can measure.
The same kind of thing can happen with economic activities, except
that the chain of causation may be less visible. Moreover, government co-
operation may be much less effective when the harm is purely economic:
the host government may have little political incentive to help stop an activ-
ity that produces harm in a neighboring jurisdiction but profit at home.
These realities must be borne in mind when dealing with today's hard ques-
tions of antitrust jurisdiction.
There are varied views on jurisdiction. At one extreme is the "pure
territoriality" theory.46 Under this doctrine someone operating in one terri-
tory-or perhaps on the high seas-can do absolutely whatever he wants,
regardless of how harmful it is to persons in another territory, as long as the
act is not illegal where he physically does it.47 With all due respect, this
44. See generall)
,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1965, at 1, col. 7.
45. See, e.g., Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Canada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905
(1949).
46. Subjective territoriality.
47. A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether
or not such consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the
territory ....
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view is more suitable to the simpler world of Queen Victoria than to our
highly technological and interdependent world; and, in the economic realm,
it tends to support private "beggar your neighbor" undertakings.
At the other extreme is what might be called the "pure intervention-
ism" theory,48 which is popular with a certain class of antitrust zealots in
the United States. This theory holds that whatever is done in one state may
be subjected to the jurisdiction of another state if it has some, however
small, impact there.49 This view is equally outmoded. It is appropriate for a
world in which little commercial activity flows back and forth among na-
tions and some great power takes upon itself the role of policing trade and
relationships among nations. It is inappropriate for today's post-imperial
world, filled with touchy sensitivities over sovereignty and experiencing a
growing level of trade, travel, and investment among nations.
Where should we go from here? And by "we" I mean not only the
United States but Canada and other major countries. We have to find, pre-
sumably at least in part under the rubric of comity, some workable compro-
mise between the polar extremes of "pure territoriality" and "pure
interventionism"; and then we have to make this compromise work by
greater cooperation in law enforcement.
Antitrust offers a good place to look at this question, especially where
it deals with tangible trade flows. Several of us at the Department of Justice
have talked publicly about this issue for some time.50 We have suggested
that the U.S. prosecutors ought to be asserting jurisdiction only: (1) where a
restraint has a substantial impact on U.S. import trade; or (2) where there
exists a substantial and direct private restraint on the export trade opportu-
nities of firms operating in the United States. The former is the much more
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 17(a)
(1965).
48. Objective territoriality.
49. A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to
conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its territory, if
either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent elements of a
crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably developed legal systems, or
(b)(i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the
rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct
and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not
inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have rea-
sonably developed legal systems.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 18(a)
(1965). Restraint of trade is generally recognized as a crime and thus falls within subsection
(a). See Loevinger, Antitrust Law in the Modern World, 6 ABA INT'L & COMP. L. BULL. 20
(1962). Comment (e) to § 18 makes it clear that a substantial effect is not required to assert
jurisdiction under subsection (a).
50. See, e.g., Baker, Antitrust and World Trade: Tempest in an International Teapot?,
8 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 16, 32-38 (1974).
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important category, because it is there that the United States has a direct
consumer interest. This approach to jurisdiction has been criticized by some
as being "too narrow" in terms of American history and jurisprudence.51
Nevertheless, it is the view stated in the Justice Department's 1977 Antitrust
G'uidefor International Operations,52 and it is also in line with the modem
view of jurisdiction and comity embodied in section 40 of the Restatement
(Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 5 3
Of course, this still leaves the question of "what is substantial." This is
not a new question for antitrust lawyers, since much antitrust jurisprudence
turns on notions of substantiality.5 4 It seems to be clear that a price-fix car-
ried out in an international market in which American purchasers buy 80
percent of the supply involves a substantial impact on U.S. commerce. Con-
versely, the same price-fix in a broad market in which American purchasers
account for less than 10 percent of the market probably does not involve
any "substantial" impact on U.S. commerce. In the latter circumstance, it
would plainly be wise for the United States--or any other nation similarly
situated-to refrain from seeking to exercise jurisdiction. This would be es-
pecially clear where the other 90 percent of sales were to customers within
the territory where the cartel was formed and the government there for-
mally supported the cartel.
This test of substantiality opens up the possibility that at least two
antitrust-minded nations may assert jurisdiction. For example, suppose a
private producers' cartel covers some important raw material-40 percent
of which is sold in the United States with an additional 40 percent sold in
the European Economic Community (EEC). Both would indeed have a
substantial interest and both would properly be able to enforce their anti-
trust laws against it. This situation, I submit, is not essentially different from
51. See, e.g., Rahl, American Antitrust and Foreign Operations.: What Is Covered?, 8 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 1, 4-9 (1974).
52. ANTITRUST DIvisioN, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL OPERATIONS 5-7 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST GUIDE], reprinted in ANTI-
TRUST &TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 799, at E-1 (1977), and TRADE REG. REPORTS (CCH)
No. 266, pt. 11 (1977).
53. (1965). Section 40 provides:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules
they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is
required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its
enforcement jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions
would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the
other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be
expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-67 (1963).
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the way piracy is dealt with: if a conspiracy were formed to practice piracy
on the ships or planes of the United States and the EEC, both could and
would exercise jurisdiction.55 In fact, this is what was done with the famous
quinine cartel, where both the U.S. Justice Department 56 and the EEC
Commission 57 proceeded against the quinine producers for price fixing. In
that case, substantiality was seen not only in a significant volume of sales to
American buyers, but also in the defendants' efforts to manipulate the U.S.
Government's disposition of its surplus stockpile to insure that the overseas
cartel would not be disrupted by excess supply.
58
To summarize, a government can and should exercise antitrust juris-
diction over restraints, practiced abroad but by people subject to personal
jurisdiction, where the restraint has a substantial impact on sales at home.
Substantiality can be measured in terms of sales that actually have taken
place, or that would have been likely to have taken place absent the re-
straint.59 Determining whether a restraint has a substantial impact may not
be easy, but it is more realistic than applying either "pure territoriality" or
"pure interventionism" as a basis for jurisdiction.
IV
ANTICOMPETITIVE ROLES OF GOVERNMENT
Jurisdiction is not the only subject on which we need a new spirit of
pragmatic accommodation. Another one concerns government involvement
in cartel activities.
Of course governments can be very cartel-minded.60 Governments can
55. See Convention on the High Seas, doneApr. 29, 1958, art. 19, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (providing that "every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft" and
that "[t]he courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be
imposed."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
34 (1965) (providing that "[a] state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law with respect to
piracy" consistent with the Convention on the High Seas).
56. United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor Chemiche Industrie, Cr. No.
68-870 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 25, 1968); id Civ. No. 70-2079 (S.D.N.Y., filed May 21, 1970). See
[1974] 2 Trade Cas. 75,434 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (transcript).
57. See generallACF Chemiefarma NV v. Commission des Communaut6s europdennes,
16 Recueil de la Jurisprudence de la Cour [RJ.C.] 661, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] Comm.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8083 (Ct. J. Comm. Eur. 1970); Buchler & Co. v. Commission des
Communaut6s europ6ennes, 16 R.J.C. 733, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8084 (Ct. J. Comm. Eur. 1970); Boehringer Mannheim GmbH v. Commission des
Communautds europ6ennes, 16 R.J.C. 769, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COmm. MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8085 (Ct. J. Comm. Eur. 1970).
58. Complaint at 20(h), United States v. N.V. Nederlandsche Combinatie Voor
Chemiche Industrie, Civ. No. 70-2079 (S.D.N.Y., ified May 21, 1970).
59. Cf United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (an unsuccessful
outside bidder had a substantial impact on market price levels in an otherwise monopolistic
market).
60. Governments have become increasingly involved in "cartel' and "commercial" activi-
ties. Generally, in the post-Keynesian world, national governments regard it as a central re-
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carry out, encourage, order, or wink at cartel activities in a variety of differ-
ent ways.6' Does governmental interest or involvement itself end the anti-
trust inquiry? No, of course not. This answer has been clear at least since
1927 when the U.S. Supreme Court held in United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp.62 that foreign government legislation, helping to implement a cartel
and passed at the instigation of the cartel members, did not provide U.S.
antitrust immunity.63
This issue is developed most fully within the American federation.
State and local governments support, and at times even implement, re-
straints on competition that run flatly contrary to the federal interest in an-
titrust enforcement and interstate trade.64 There have been a considerable
number of antitrust cases, often private ones, arising out of such state activi-
ties. 65 What has emerged is a rule providing that when private parties are
engaged in a restraint on competition commanded by the state as sovereign,
sponsibility to intervene directly in--or displace--competitive markets to promote their own
domestic employment, income, and public welfare goals.
Key primary products cartels, including OPEC and the uranium cartel, see notes 118-23
infraand accompanying text, have given great public visibility to cartel activities. Other pri-
mary products producers have sought to emulate OPEC. These activities raise very important
"political" questions both for producer-country governments, especially where sales of a single
product account for a very large proportion of the nation's GNP, and for consumer-country
governments heavily dependent on imports. Sometimes, as in the case of the Canadian ura-
nium transactions, both producer and consumer political interests are raised.
Governments, including the U.S. Government, have also become involved in arranging or
encouraging private quota agreements when "too much competition" from outside is "politi-
cally unacceptable" for the importing country. See, e.g., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v.
Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.D.C. 1973), ajf'd in part sub nom Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.
v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In addition, in recent years governments have
become more heavily involved in running "commercial" enterprises that trade in or with the
United States. This is true in the transportation sector, see, e.g., Victory Transport Inc. v.
Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F. 2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cerl.
denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965), and government nationalization has made it increasingly true in
various producer markets, see, e.g., Alfred Dunbill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425
U.S. 682, 702-03 (1976).
61. Government involvement in cartel activities can be divided into seven broad catego-
ries: (1) sovereign compulsion, seenote 66 infra and accompanying text; (2) formal approval,
seenote 67 infraand accompanying text; (3) formal state ratification after the fact, seenote 67
infra; (4) state acquiescence, seenote 67 infra; (5) state delegation of the power to restrain to
private parties, see notes 72-75 infra and accompanying text; (6) state authorization of a re-
straint in a "commercial" contract, see note 67 infra; and (7) informal encouragement, see
notes 68-71 infra and accompanying text.
62. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
63. The Government charged the defendants with monopolizing the import and sale of
sisal in the United States. Although "the conspirators were aided by discriminating legislation"
passed by the Mexican federal and provincial governments, they were still held liable because
the monopoly was created and maintained "by their own deliberate acts" in the United States.
Id at 276.
64. See, eg., Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341 (1943); Padgett v. Louisville & Jefferson County Air Bd., 492 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974);
Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970).
65. See the cases cited in note 64 suprz
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then these private parties-being involuntary actors-are exempt from the
antitrust laws.66 Where, however, the state merely authorizes the private
parties to engage in the restraints, and they voluntarily choose to do so, no
antitrust immunity is necessarily present.67 It goes without saying that infor-
66. "The state in adopting and enforcing the... program made no contract or agreement
and entered into no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish [a] monopoly but, as sover-
eign, imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not undertake
to prohibit." Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943). SeeBates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 359-63 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790-91 (1975). This
rationale seems to apply to direct action taken or commanded by a foreign sovereign within its
territory. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
When a foreign government seeks to compel a restraint within the United States, such com-
pulsion is not likely to provide immunity. One district court, however, has allowed the defense
of sovereign compulsion in such circumstances. See Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco
Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970). But the Department of Justice has made
very clear that it opposes the Interamerican court's view. ANTITRUST GUIDE, supranote 52, at
50-52. The argument, which I find persuasive, is that the foreign government-compelled re-
straint within the U.S. market is wholly beyond the foreign state's jurisdiction. See United
States v. Bechtel Corp., [1976] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 747, at D-1 (N.D.
Cal., filed Jan. 16, 1976) (Department of Justice sought to enjoin a boycott within the United
States commanded by various sovereigns abroad); Competitive Impact Statement of United
States, 42 Fed. Reg. 3718 (1977).
In general, the more "commercial" the state's role, the less likely it is that a court will recog-
nize a claim of antitrust immunity and the more likely that it will treat the state's "command"
as a mere contractual "restraint."
67. In Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), the Court stressed that "a state does not give
immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declar-
ing that their action is lawful." Id at 351. Therefore, a court may inquire into the nature of the
state's approval, the role of the private parties in bringing it about, and the importance to the
state of the approved private conduct. See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268
(1927).
In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), the Court disallowed the defense of
sovereign approval to a utility defendant that allegedly monopolized the sale of light bulbs by
tying it to the sale of electricity. The utility claimed that the electric service tariffs approved
and ordered into effect by the Michigan Public Service Commission provided antitrust immu-
nity. Recognizing that "cases of this kind involve a blend of private and public decisionmak-
ing," id at 592, the Court contrasted two polar situations. On the one hand, notwithstanding
state participation, the private party may have exercised sufficient freedom of choice so that he
could be held responsible for the consequences of his acts. On the other hand, "there may be
cases in which the State's participation in a decision is so dominant that it would be unfair to
hold a private party responsible for his conduct in implementing it." 1d at 592-95. In Cantor
the Court denied immunity because (1) the utility initiated and implemented the light bulb
sales program; and (2) supplying light bulbs was not central to the government agency's task
of regulating electric power distribution. Id at 594-95, 597 n.37.
Cantor and Sisalboth involved prior formal state approval of the challenged restraint, but
there is another type of approval: formal state ratification after the fact. State ratification is
entitled to less weight in determining antitrust immunity than is prior approval because the
occurrence of commercial activity prior to state approval makes clear that private initiative
was the dominant factor in the scheme to restrain. The argument for immunity here rests upon
traditional considerations of comity: is the subsequently approved conduct so important to the
foreign government that the activity should be protected against antitrust attack?
An additional form of government "involvement" in cartel activities is state acquiescence,
which is entitled to even less weight than either formal approval or state ratification. State
acquiescence in a restraint generally does not provide a basis for recognizing antitrust immu-
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mal encouragement by public officials does not provide the basis for immu-
nity-for here again the key voluntary choice belongs to the private parties
who actually impose the restraint.68 Interestingly, the leading American
case on price fixing involved successful Justice Department prosecution of a
gasoline price stabilization scheme informally encouraged by officials in the
Department of the Interior during the Great Depression. The Supreme
Court said in United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co.69 that to allow such
informal prompting as a defense would be to put the effective administra-
tion of the antitrust laws into the hands of "virtual volunteers. ' 70 Some-
times the government officials may even be regarded as co-conspirators in
the private scheme, especially when the officials are acting beyond the scope
of their legal duties.7 '
Liability can also occur where a sovereign formaly delegates its power
to some essentially private firm or group-making the latter a self-regulator
or "a state agency for limited purposes."7 2 The sovereign delegation may be
nity. In its landmark decision, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940),
the Supreme Court stated what is surely the general rule: "Ithough employees of the govern-
ment may have known of those programs and winked at them or tacitly approved them, no
immunity would have thereby been obtained." Id at 226. A limited exception, however, might
be found where: (a) the state is thoroughly familiar with the private activity and adopts a "no
action" policy (which is tantamount to affirmative approval); and (b) the matter is so impor-
tant to the state that its "no action" position should be respected. For example, in United
States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975) (5-4 decision), the Supreme
Court held that a federal regulatory agency's continued acquiescence in a series of restraints
for three decades provided implied immunity. The agency's assent "hardly represents abdica-
tion of its regulatory responsibilities. Rather, we think it manifests in an informed administra-
tive judgment that the [privately formulated restraints] were appropriate means for combating
the problems of the industry." Id at 728. Most federal agency cases, however, have denied
immunity where agency acquiescence is involved. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United
States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
A final form of state authorization is authorization of a restraint in a "commercial" contract.
Such approval does not appear to create a general basis for antitrust immunity. The normal
rule is surely reflected in Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 US. 1047 (1972), which allowed an antitrust challenge to a stadium lease between
a government agency and a private firm.
68. One can imagine some very special circumstances in despotic countries that might call
for an exception to this general rule. For example, would a casual suggestion by President
Amin of Uganda more properly be regarded as an "informal encouragement" or as a "com-
mand by the state as sovereign"?
69. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
70. Id at 225-27.
71. SeeGoldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975) ("The State Bar...
has voluntarily joined in what is essentially a private anticompetitive activity, and in that pos-
ture cannot claim it is beyond the reach of the Sherman Act."); cf Harman v. Valley Nat'l
Bank of Ariz., 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964) (attempt to induce action by attorney general may
be evidence of scheme to monopolize or restrain trade); Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v.
Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-23 (D.D.C. 1973), a§'d inpart sub non Consumers Union of
U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (executive branch lacks authority to
immunize private restraint agreement from antitrust laws).
72. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791 (1975).
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a sine qua non to any restraint-but it is still the private party who chooses
how to exercise the power.73 If the private party has a pecuniary interest in
how the power is exercised, then it probably cannot hide behind the state's
sovereignty.74 As a practical matter, the issue comes up most often when the
state delegates power to some self-regulatory organization-for example, a
professional association-which in turn uses its power to exclude competi-
tion.75
The newest question in this area is whether "commercial" activities
undertaken by a government are subject to the antitrust laws. This is a
question of growing practical importance, as governments take on more
and more functions that traditionally have been performed by the private
sector, such as running transportation terminals, mass transit, and sports
stadiums. Past Supreme Court decisions have recognized that when a gov-
ernment body undertakes "commerciar' activity it can be subjected to fed-
eral regulatory law76 and to federal taxing power.77 This year the Court
faced the antitrust question head on and, in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co.,78 held that the federal antitrust laws could be applied to
73. Cases in which the state delegates the power to restrain to private parties involve the
same issue present in the "formal approval" cases: is the state itself the moving force behind
the restraint or is the private party, exercising power delegated by the state, really responsible
for the restraint?
For example, in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690
(1962), a Canadian government agency delegated to a private firm "the discretionary agency
power to purchase and allocate to Canadian industries" all supplies of a particular product
during World War H. Id at 703 n.l 1. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the claim that
this formal delegation immunized the defendant against an antitrust charge that the defendant
had used the delegated power to favor its own affiliate and to exclude competing sellers from
the Canadian market. "There is nothing to indicate that [the Canadian] law in any way com-
pelled discriminatory purchasing .... " Id at 707.
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), the state's legislature and highest
court had delegated broad authority to control the legal profession to a state instrumentality
staffed by practicing lawyers. When the State Bar's power was used to restrain price competi-
tion, the Government sought to impose antitrust liability. The issue, said the Court, was
whether the anticompetitive activities were "compelled by direction of the State acting as sov-
ereign." Id at 791. The Court unanimously agreed that the State Bar's actions were "volun-
tary" and "private." Id at 792. "The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited
purposes does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster anticompetitive practices for
the benefit of its members." Id at 791 (footnote omitted).
74. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975); Gibson v. Berryhill,
411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973).
75. See the cases cited in note 74 supra
76. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 313 U.S. 450 (1941) (a city that participated
jointly with a railroad in developing a terminal facility could be held liable for illegal discrim-
ination under the Elkins Act); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-87 (1936) (state
operation of common carrier held subject to federal regulatory law).
77. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360 (1934) (state operated liquor monopoly subject to fed-
erally imposed tax on those selling liquor).
78. 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
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"commercial" activities carried out by municipalities. The Court plurality79
reasoned that
the economic choices made by public corporations in the conduct of their
business affairs, designed as they are to assure maximum benefits for the
community constituency, are not inherently more likely to comport with the
broader interests of national economic well-being than are those of private
corporations acting in furtherance of the interests of the organization and its
shareholders.80
For the plurality, the ultimate question was one of state law: did the state,
as sovereign, command, or at least explicitly authorize, the municipality to
engage in the anticompetitive contracts and other activities that would
otherwise violate the federal antitrust laws? It emphasized that "all govern-
ment entities, whether state agencies or subdivisions of a state, are [not],
simply by reason of their status as such, exempt from the antitrust laws."81
For Chief Justice Burger, who provided the crucial fifth vote, the issue was
not one of municipal law so much as a question of whether the government
bodies were "engaging in what is clearly a business activity; activity in
which a profit is realized."82 The Chief Justice would not exempt such
"commercial" activity from the federal antitrust laws unless it was strictly
necessary to comply with the command of the state as sovereign-that is, he
would place governmental "commercial" activity on very much the same
footing as private commercial activity.
Although all the implications of City of Lafayette are not clear for for-
eign and government-owned "commercial" undertakings, one thing does
seem clear: a majority of the Supreme Court is squarely set against giving
antitrust immunity to government-owned "commercial" enterprises simply
because they are government-owned. Such enterprises, when they restrain
competition in the American market, are even less likely than locally owned
commercial enterprises to be concerned about the American consumer's in-
terest, which the antitrust laws are designed to protect. This conclusion is
fully in line with the Supreme Court's recent decision that foreign govern-
ment-owned "commercial" undertakings are not entitled to plead sovereign
immunity in U.S. courts83-a decision since ratified by Congress.84 To say
79. The four-member plurality consisted of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Powell, and Ste-
vens.
80. 98 S. Ct. at 1131.
81. Id at 1134.
82. Id at 1139 (quoting the findings of the district court).
83. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
84. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The statute defines "commercial activity" as "either a
regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commerical transaction or act. The com-
mercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." 28 U.S.C. §
1603(d) (1976).
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this, of course, does not answer the hard practical questions of whether a
foreign government activity should be regarded as "commercial" or "sover-
eign," and whether this issue should be judged under foreign law and prac-
tice or U.S. law and practice. 85
It is thus not enough that "government" is vaguely interested in some
particular aspect of the restraint. For antitrust purposes, the decisive ques-
tions will be: What is government's role, interest, and power? Precisely how
did the government carry out its role? All this may sound terribly technical,
but I think that it should be viewed in the context of America's historic goal
to have a government of laws and not men, and its more formalized ap-
proach to public administration.
Perhaps the United States, in the spirit of comity, ought to apply a
different rule with respect to foreign governments-saying, in effect, that so
long as there is some "governmental" interest, the scheme ought to be ex-
empt from the American antitrust laws. The argument for such an approach
would be: "After all, foreign governments often act informally and with
broad discretion, so that even a quite informal bureaucratic suggestion may
be tantamount to an order. Sure, the businessman may ignore the sugges-
tion this time, but heaven help him the next time he needs approval for
something from the same ministry or department."
There is some merit in this thought, but truly it goes too far. Suppose,
for example, that the world's producers of some energy source think it
would be good if their prices were higher. Perhaps they go to the U.S. Sec-
retary of Energy and ask him what he thinks about forming some sort of
producers' cartel to "stabilize" prices and increase the predictability of sup-
ply. The Secretary agrees that such stabilization would be a fine idea be-
cause "higher prices should produce more exploration." Now the same
producers go to the Minister of Energy in each of the other major supplying
nations, and each time they get the same answer: "It is a fine idea, and it
will also help our balance of payments." Yet the American Secretary's in-
formal blessing and encouragement is absolutely no defense under U.S. an-
titrust law.86 He is "a virtual volunteer."' 87 Reaching the opposite result for
the equally informal blessing of the Canadian or French Minister of Energy
would produce an anomalous result, which would be politically unaccept-
able within the United States. In sum, there may well be some room for
greater flexibility in how the United States treats foreign government in-
85. See Baker, Antitrust Remedies Against Government-Inspired Boycotts, Shortages, and
Squeezes: Wandering on the Road to Mecca, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 911, 927-31 (1976). The
Department of Justice itself has stated: "we recognize that drawing the line between what is
'sovereign' and 'commercial' may prove difficult in particular cases, which may turn in part on
questions of foreign law, custom and practice." ANTITRUST GUIDE, supra note 52, at 8 n.21.
86. See notes 68-71 supra and accompanying text.
87. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 227 (1940).
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volvement in anticompetitive behavior-just for reasons of diplomacy and
comity-but it really cannot go as far as accepting pure informal bureau-
cratic encouragement as a defense to a substantial private trade restraint.
Let us assume, however, that a foreign government is in fact the mov-
ing party. It wants to "stabilize" prices and production in a key indus-
try-in essence to "cartelize" that industry. The government can do this and
ensure that no U.S. antitrust violation occurs. But this requires that the for-
eign government play the dominant role and essentially eliminate private
discretion.88 In other words, the foreign government, alone or in conjunc-
tion with other governments, must carry out or mandate the cartel actions
itself as sovereign. Then there is no U.S. antitrust liability regardless of the
impact on American consumers.8 9 This is what the OPEC experience
shows, for there governments themselves are openly operating the most ef-
fective cartel in the history of the world, free from antitrust liability.90 Why,
some ask, should this be so? The reason is that any private activity is essen-
tially involuntary or nonexistent; and the truly sovereign, political activities
are beyond the effective reach of the U.S. courts for antitrust or any other
purposes. The question turns on sovereign immunity pure and simple.9 1
The antitrust result is the same where the foreign state formally com-
mands a private enterprise to do something abroad that directly affects the
U.S. market.92 For example, suppose that an energy-producing country
commands its subjects, by statute or order in council, not to export a partic-
ular product at less than so many dollars a ton. The energy producer, who
sells to American buyers at the state-mandated minimum price, engages in
no antitrust violation even if the state-mandated price is intended to prop
up the cartel of which that producer was a member. This issue has come up
88. Gulf Oil Corporation, one of the alleged members of the Canadian uranium cartel,
took "extraordinary care to ensure [that] its participation was at the direction of the Canadian
Government." The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Sept. 30, 1977, at 1, col. 1, at 2, col. 2. Gulf
balked at the initial invitation to join the cartel, raising its prices only after it had been told to
do so by Canada's Deputy Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources. Id at 2, col. 7.
89. Seenote 66 supra and accompanying text.
90. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was founded in 1960 by
five major petroleum states. The present member states of OPEC are: Algeria, Ecuador, Ga-
bon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Republic, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 1978, at
598.
For a general discussion of the legal and economic position of the oil industry in the Middle
East, see G. LENczowsKI, MIDDLE EAST OIL IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE (National Energy
Project 1976).
91. Under the "sovereign immunity" doctrine, a foreign government is exempt from suit
simply because of its legal status as a sovereign entity. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). The
doctrine no longer applies to purely "commercial" activities in the United States or to "com-
mercial" activity having an effect in the United States. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Re-
public of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 698-705 (1976); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
92. SeeInteramerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del.
1970).
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in the Arab boycott context, where Arab governments have compelled firms
not to land supplies identified as having been procured from a "blacklisted"
source.
93
But I think that this is the unusual case. More often a cartel involves "a
blend of public and private decision making."'94 Where the private effort is
dominant the private party can, and should, be held liable for its anticom-
petitive initiatives. 95 Where a foreign government formally approves a car-
tel this may suggest that some basic state policy lies behind the restraint. In
the interest of comity, the U.S. court may want to ask how important the
matter is to the state approving the cartel and how great the impact is on the
United States. When the approved restraint has its major impact on the
American market-and especially when this is its intended purpose-I be-
lieve it is still appropriate for the United States to exercise antitrust jurisdic-
tion over the private parties for their role in the scheme.
Jurisdictional questions have also arisen in the context of export car-
tels. Many countries, including the United States, 96 formally authorize ex-
port cartels and provide them with statutory immunity from their own
law.9 7 This is done for obvious mercantilist reasons.98 Such action is un-
93. SeeUnited States v. Bechtel Corp., [1977] ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
796, at E-1 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (proposed consent judgment).
94. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592 (1976) (footnote omitted). This blend is
well illustrated by the role of the Canadian Government in response to actions taken by the
alleged uranium cartel. On August 17, 1972, the Canadian Minister of Energy, Mines and
Resources wrote to the President of the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada, instructing
the Board not to allow export of uranium from Canada to certain countries at prices below
certain minimum price-levels. Letter from Donald S. MacDonald to Dr. D.G. Hurst (Aug. 17,
1972), reproduced as an attachment to News Release by the Honourable Alastair Gillespie,
Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources (Oct. 14, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the
Cornell International Law Journal). The letter began:
On June 29, 1972, Cabinet approved the terms of uranium export marketing ar-
rangement proposed by producers in Canada and several other countries. In order to
enforce compliance with the terms of the marketing arrangements Cabinet also ap-
proved a proposal to issue an appropriate Regulation pursuant to Section 9 of the
Atomic Energy Control Act together with a Direction to be given to the Board pursu-
ant to section 7 of the Act.
Thus, this document reveals an approval by government of a privately proposed arrangement,
which was in turn implemented by government orders.
95. SeeCantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 598 (1976).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976); seenote 154 infra.
97. See, e.g., Combines Investigation Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-23, § 32(4) (1970), as
amended byAn Act to Amend the Combines Investigation Act, §§ 14(4), 32(4) [1974-76] Can.
Stat. 1535 (1975); Ordannance no. 45-1483, art. 62, [1945] Journal officiel de la r6publique
frangaise 4150, [1945] Dalloz, Lagslat/on 137; Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz.
2, c. 68, § 8(8). See generally COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES,
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, EXPORT CARTELS (1974).
98. The Webb-Pomerene Act was passed "to aid and encourage our manufacturers and
producers to extend our foreign trade." H.R. Rep. No. 1118, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1
(1916). Congress felt that American firms needed the power to form joint export as-
sociations in order to compete with foreign cartels.... Congress was willing to create
an exemption from the antitrust laws to serve this narrow purpose .... Congress
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derstandable in the context of a world in which national governments tend
to be hard-nosed champions of producer interests within their borders.
But the fact that the United States authorizes producer export car-
tels-and guarantees them immunity from American antitrust laws-is no
reason why consumer nations should not prosecute the same cartels under
their antitrust laws. Nations are entitled to be hard-nosed champions of
consumer interests; and, provided they do it evenhandedly, in accordance
with due process, the United States really has no basis for complaining. Our
Congress never thought that it had the power to hand out immunities from
the Combines Investigation Act,99 or the Treaty of Rome;1a ° and, if it did,
it would be wrong. The converse is also true. The Parliament in Ottawa or
the European Council of Ministers in Brussels has no power to dispense
general exemptions from our Sherman Act for private cartels.
All of this is salutary as a matter of practical politics. Consumers in the
world are entitled to look to their governments to protect their inter-
ests-for only the government with such a consumer stake is likely to have
the political incentive to enforce antitrust law effectively. If we deny that
power-because of quaint jurisdictional notions or just plain timid-
ity-then consumer interests will often lose out to producer protectionism.
It will just be a little easier to "beggar your neighbor" than it already is. I
for one do not find that a very attractive prospect.
V
COOPERATION OR CONFLICT IN ENFORCEMENT?
More effective cooperation among governments on these antitrust en-
forcement issues is needed. All nations are both producers and consumers.
If all nations are to protect their consumer interests-and I think they
should-then cooperation is essential. The Executive Agreement between
the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany °1' offers a good
example of what can be done. Each of the parties has a substantial antitrust
enforcement mechanism in place,10 2 and both have vigorously enforced an-
evidently made the economic judgment that joint export associations could increase
American foreign trade without depriving American consumers of the main advan-
tages of competition.
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 206 (1968).
99. CAN. REv. STAT. c. C-23 (1970), as amended
100. Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 85-86, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
101. Agreement on Restrictive Business Practices, June 23, 1976, United States-Federal
Republic of Germany, 27 U.S.T. 1956, T.I.A.S. No. 8291; [1978] 5 TRADE REQ. REP. (CCH)
1 50,283.
102. Germany's antitrust law is the Act Against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschrdnkungen), July 27, 1957, [1957] Bundesgesetzblatt [BGB1] I 1081, as
republished Apr. 4, 1974, [1974] BGBI 1869, amended, Law of June 28, 1976, [1976] BGBI I
917.
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titrust laws within their own borders. What the agreement promises is quite
extensive cooperation in securing documents and other relevant informa-
tion from parties under investigation and having activities in the other's
territory.103 This is vitally important, for if antitrust prosecution is to be
evenhanded and fair it must be based on reasonable access to relevant facts.
The United States-German agreement seems to be a large step in that direc-
tion.
What is happening in the English-speaking world, perhaps more accu-
rately described as the English-French-Afrikaans-speaking world, is far less
encouraging. There are a growing number of statutes and orders in council
specifically designed to thwart antitrust investigations by any foreign
power."14 It all began in the 1950's with the Ontario and Quebec "business
records" legislation,10 5 passed in response to extraterritorial application of
U.S. regulatory laws, including a U.S. Justice Department antitrust investi-
gation of the paper industry;106 it gained momentum with the British Ship-
ping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act of 1964,107 designed to
103. The Agreement on Restrictive Business Practices, supra note 101, art. 1(c), provides
for the exchange of "reports, documents, memoranda, expert opinions, legal briefs and plead-
ings, decisions of administrative or judicial bodies, and other written or computerized
records." Each country agrees to provide, on its own initiative, any "significant information"
relating to restrictive business practices that have a substantial effect on the other country. Id
art. 2(2). Each party further agrees to honor all requests for information provided that compli-
ance with such requests would not violate domestic law, be inconsistent with important na-
tional interests, or unreasonably burden the requested antitrust authority. Id arts. 2(3), 3(1),
(3).
104. Foreign "bank secrecy" laws have long been a potential barrier to U.S. law enforce-
ment, but generally our courts have not allowed these to be a defense to production of evi-
dence by a party over whom the United States has personal jurisdiction. United States v.
Field, 532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976) (tax investigation); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank,
396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968) (antitrust investigation).
105. Business Records Protection Act, [1947] Ont. Stat. c. 10 (codified at ONT. REv. STAT.
c. 54 (1970)); Business Concerns Records Act, [1957-581 Que. Stat. c. 42 (1958) (codified at
QuE. REv. STAT. c. 278 (1964)). Both acts prohibit the removal of any business records from
the respective provinces in compliance with a request or order from any judicial, legislative, or
administrative governmental authority outside the province. If there is reason to believe that
such a foreign request or order will be made, the Attorney General of the province may peti-
tion a court for an order requiring persons to post security to ensure that no one will remove
the records in compliance with the foreign request or order. The acts impose criminal penal-
ties, including imprisonment, for noncompliance if the person seeking removal of the records
knows of the Attorney General's application.
106. See generalpIn reGrand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Canadian Int'l
Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
107. 1964, c. 87, modjied by the Transfer of Functions (Shipping and Construction of
Ships) Order 1965, para. 2, 1965 STAT. INST. No. 145, andMinistry of Aviation Supply (Disso-
lution) Order 1971, para. 2(1), 1971 STAT. INST. No. 719. Section 1 of the Act authorizes the
British Board of Trade to prohibit compliance with any measures taken by foreign countries to
control "the terms or conditions upon which goods or passengers may be carried by sea" if it
appears to the Board "that those measures, in so far as they apply to things done or to be done
outside the territorial jurisdiction of that country. . . constitute an infringement of the juris-
diction which, under international law, belongs to the United Kingdom." Id § 1(1). The Act
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thwart Federal Maritime Commission investigations; 0 8 and it reached full
maturity with the special restrictions by Canada, 0 9 Australia, 110 South Af-
rica,II 1 and France 1 2 designed to bar the U.S. Justice Department investi-
gation of the alleged uranium cartel." 13
The irony of all this is particularly apparent in the context of the 1964
British Shipping Act. Shipping, like air travel, necessarily involves coopera-
tion between the sovereigns at the ends of the routes. It is fine for the British
Parliament to say in effect, "We don't want the Yanks messing around with
our boats"-but to say that surely is not the end of the analysis, nor I sus-
pect even the end of the beginning of the analysis. It so happens that in this
area both Britain and the United States accept a shipping conference sys-
tem-but with important differences. The American Shipping Act makes
clear that antitrust immunity is only for conference arrangements regulated
and approved by the U.S. Federal Maritime Commission. 1 4 The British do
not purport to regulate conference activity, instead leaving this to the ship-
ping lines. 115 That "hands-off" policy runs contrary to the American and
the Adam Smith ethic: 1 6 in the United States, private commercial enter-
prises, serving their own interests, are not left free to restrain whatever they
deem to be in their own best interest. Rather, under American policy, the
antitrust laws apply as a barrier to cartel behavior unless some other gov-
ernment's scheme is put in their place as a safeguard. 117 The British, of
also permits a British Secretary of State to prohibit compliance with a foreign court's request
for the production of commercial documents if it appears to the Secretary that the request
"constitutes or would constitute an infringement of the jurisdiction which, under international
law, belongs to the United Kingdom." Id § 2(l)(b). The Act imposes a substantial fine for
noncompliance. Id § 3(1).
108. See 698 PARE. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1215-84 (1964). See generally In re Grand Jury
Investigation of the Shipping Indus., 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960).
109. SeeUranium Information Security Regulations, SOR/77-836, 111 Can. Gaz. pt. II, at
4619 (1977) (replacing Uranium Information Security Regulations, SOR/76-644, I 10 Can.
Gaz. pt. II, at 2747 (1976)).
110. See Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 121
(Austl.), as amended by Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment
Act, 1976, No. 202 (Austl.), as implemented by Order of the Attorney General, Austl. Gov't
Gaz. No. S.214 (Nov. 29, 1976).
111. Atomic Energy Act, 1967, No. 90, § 30, 15 STAT. REPuB. So. AFR. 1045 (1977).
112. See Cheeseright, R7Z stands in the shade, Financial Times (London), Nov. 8, 1977,
at 14, cols. 3, 7.
113. Seenotes 118-39 infra and accompanying text.
114. 46 U.S.C. § 814 (1976).
115. See698 PAR!. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) 1218-21 (1964). See also id at 1222-24.
116. People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion,
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to
raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either
could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law
cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought
to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.
1 A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 200 (4th ed. London 1822).
117. In 1963, the Supreme Court stated: "Subject to narrow qualifications, it is surely the
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course, fundamentally object to anybody regulating their ships. My answer
is both blunt and realistic: "If the British want to sail into American ports,
abide by American rules. If the United States wants to sail into British
ports, we jolly well will have to abide by Britain's rules. If one power man-
dates what the other power prohibits, there is no trade." I see nothing-on
jurisdictional or other grounds-that is outrageous about the United States
saying that those who haul cargo to U.S. ports will have to meet the Ameri-
can requirements protecting competition as set forth in the Shipping Act
and the antitrust laws. American competitive policies are wholly consistent
with freedom of the seas. The only thing they are not consistent with is the
"strict territoriality" theory of jurisdiction.
What is disturbing about this crop of "business records" laws is that
they are being used to prevent the United States from even investigating
whether a violation of its laws may have taken place. The result is political
outrage and frustration in the United States. It is also likely to result in
more haphazard and uneven law enforcement. The Antitrust Division
prides itself on careful investigation and evenhandedness in selecting de-
fendants in any case it ultimately decides to bring. The present environment
will put great pressure on the Division to bring cases based on less evidence,
simply because it will have to act on what it infers from the possibly dis-
torted fragments of evidence it has. Defendants will be similarly prejudiced:
the same laws may prevent them from producing any clarifying or exculpa-
tory evidence that might otherwise be available. As a result, trials may be
shorter but decisions less just. No lawyer can take pride in that.
The depth and the complexity of this issue is clear from the "Great
Uranium Saga"" 8 that is now being played to packed houses of lawyers
and journalists at the Royal Courts of Justice in London'19 and at the U. S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Richmond.' 20 This
controversy arose because a few years back Westinghouse Electric Corpora-
tion sold a lot of American utilities a lot of uranium that it turned out not to
case that competition is our fundamental national economic policy, offering as it does the only
alternative to the cartelization or governmental regimentation of large portions of the econ-
omy." United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 372 (1963). This same message
runs throughout the Court's recent decision in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 98 S. Ct. 1123 (1978).
118. See generally Note, Discovery in Great Britain: The Evidence (Proceedings in Other
Jurisdictions) Act, 11 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 323, 324-25 & nn.4-7 (1978).
119. The proceedings in England began when Westinghouse Electric Corporation submit-
ted applications to Master Creightmore of the Queen's Bench Division, requesting him to
make ex parte orders giving effect to letters rogatory issued by Judge Merhige of the U. S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Master Creightmore made the orders on
October 28, 1976. See In reWestinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1977] 3
W.L.R. 430, 433 (C.A.), rev'd on add'Ifacts, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977).
120. See In reWestinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 316
(J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
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have. When the price of uranium skyrocketed from about $7 a pound to
approximately $42, Westinghouse refused to perform these contracts on
grounds of "commercial impracticability."'' 21 The utilities sued, and most
of their cases were consolidated in Richmond.122 Among other things,
Westinghouse argued in its defense that the emergence of the uranium pro-
ducers' "club" was not something that it could reasonably have foreseen. 123
In due course, the District Judge in Richmond issued letters rogatory to the
High Court in London, asking for oral testimony and documents from the
senior officials of Rio Tinto Zinc, Ltd., which was allegedly a leading mem-
ber of the "club."' 24 The letters rogatory were issued pursuant to a treaty125
and statute 126 in England covering civil litigation. The British executives
and Rio Tinto strenuously objected to such discovery. Using a degree of
lawyerly ingenuity, they argued that their testimony might incriminate
them in violation of the fifth amendment of the U. S. Constitution and sub-
ject them to penalties under the Treaty of Rome antitrust regulations. 127
The English Court of Appeal allowed the company to withhold the docu-
ments because of its potential exposure to penalties under the EEC regula-
tions,128 and held that the possibility of violations of the fifth amendment,
which only applied to the individuals, was a question for the American
court.1 29 The U.S. District Judge, sitting in London, then ruled in favor of
the fifth amendment privilege.' 30 Thereafter, Westinghouse prevailed on
the Department of Justice to issue what amounted to an immunity order to
121. In reWestinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [19781 2 W.L.R. 81, 85
(H.L. 1977). Westinghouse relied on U.C.C. § 2-615 for the "commercial impracticability"
defense. Id
122. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, 405 F. Supp. 316
(J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
123. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1977] 3 W.L.R.
430, 435 (C.A.), rev'd on add'lfacts, [19781 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977).
124. Id
125. Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad, openedforsignatureMar. 18, 1970, 23
U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444. The Treaty establishes procedures for obtaining evidence lo-
cated in a foreign jurisdiction. Both the United Kingdom and the United States are parties. See
id; [1977] Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 20 (Cmnd. 6727).
126. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, c. 34. The Act sets forth the
procedures by which and the conditions under which English courts can enforce letters roga-
tory. See generallyNote, supranote 118.
127. RMglement No. 17 Premier rkglement d'application des articles 85 et 86 du Iraitb, 5
JOURNAL OFFICIEL DES COMMUNAuTas EUROPPENNES 204 (1962) (promulgated under au-
thority of the Treaty of Rome, doneMar. 25, 1957, arts. 85, 86, 298 U.N.T.S. II). The legisla-
tion of the European Economic Community has the force of law in England. European
Communities Act, 1972, c. 68, § 2(1).
128. In reWestinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 430,
439-41 (C.A.), rev'don add'lfacts, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L. 1977).
129. Id at 441.
130. InreWestinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81, 90
(H.L. 1977).
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compel testimony in the private case.' 3' In explaining its unusual course,
the Department stressed that it was not acting on Westinghouse's behalf;
rather, it wanted immunity because the Westinghouse depositions appeared
to be the Government's only reasonable prospect for ever obtaining the tes-
timony of these Rio Tinto officials for use by its grand jury. 32
Then things got "curiouser and curiouser."' 33 Exposed individuals do
not normally resist immunity orders-yet this is exactly what the Britons
did, first in the District Court in Richmond 34 and then back in the Courts
of Justice in England. 35 They argued that to allow the Department of Jus-
tice to obtain this testimony, through this indirect route, was a perversion of
the treaty and the statute and was contrary to the interests of Great Brit-
ain. 1 36 In effect, they were arguing that any evidence that was likely to fall
into the hands of the Department of Justice should be barred from private
litigants with a legitimate right under the treaty. Rio Tinto was supported
by counsel for the British Attorney General, who argued that there was a
state interest in nondisclosure. 137 The House of Lords unanimously agreed
with Rio Tinto. 138 Although the Lords did not invoke Crown privilege by
name, they declared that granting Westinghouse's request for discovery
would run counter to the longstanding British policy of noncooperation
with American courts seeking to enforce U.S. antitrust laws overseas.' 39
What this saga reveals is how determined members of the uranium "club"
are to prevent evidence from falling into the hands of American prosecu-
tors. England became a key forum for a very practical reason: it is the only
country that has a "club" member and has not erected a general barrier
against U.S. discovery of uranium documents.
131. See id at 91; Letter from Griffin B. Bell, U.S. Attorney General, to William B. Cum-
mings, U.S. Attorney, E.D. Va., (July 12, 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the CornellInter-
national Law Journal). See also 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003 (1976) (federal immunity of witnesses
provisions).
132. Letter from Griffin B. Bell, supra note 131, at 1.
133. L. CARROLL, Alice ~rAdventures in Wonderland, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF LEwis
CARROLL 23 (1939).
134. Memorandum of Views Furnished for the Honourable Robert R. Merhige, Jr. by
Linidaters & Paines, In reWestinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, M.D.L.
No. 75-235 (E.D. Va. 1977) (copy on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law
Journal).
135. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R.
81, 92 (H.L. 1977).
136. See id at 96.
137. See id at 93-94.
138. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81
(H.L. 1977).
139. Id at 94.
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VI
SOME PRAGMATIC SUGGESTIONS
I am an American and a friend of Canada. As such, I find it important
that Canada and the United States try to work out the complex mess in
which they find themselves. This is equally true of the other common law
countries involved. 14 There are no simple answers-and certainly no an-
swers that will satisfy ideological zealots-but there are some pragmatic
steps that can be taken.
A. PRACTICAL ADVICE TO THE UNITED STATES
I recommend that the United States do the following:
(1) Make clear-and sure-that U.S. enforcement agencies do not
pursue a "pure interventionist" position on antitrust jurisdiction. For exam-
ple, they should be sensitive about the "interventionist" reach of the type
shown in some drafts of the Premerger Notification Regulations, 141 which
seem to cover a great many foreign mergers likely to have at most a modest
impact on U.S. markets. 42 The Department of Justice, as amicus, should
help in urging a more limited view-such as my "substantial impact"
test143-by U.S. courts in private antitrust cases.
(2) Recognize that the grand jury, which has been largely abandoned
elsewhere in the common law world, has a lingering "star chamber" image
among many people abroad. This being so, the Department of Justice
should use the grand jury to investigate possible violations by overseas par-
ties only when it seems more probable than not that a criminal indictment
will be likely to come out of it. This is narrower than the Department's
normal standard for authorizing a grand jury investigation-which is to
proceed with the grand jury when a reasonable possibility exists that an
investigation may result in criminal liability.144 Under my proposal, the
Department would still proceed by civil investigation, using its broad new
civil powers. 145 If the Department finds, after a civil investigation, that in
fact a criminal violation is present, then it can still obtain an indictment by
presenting the evidence to the grand jury.
140. Most notably Britain, Australia, and South Africa.
141. Federal Trade Commission, Mergers and Acquisitions, Proposed Rulemaking, 41
Fed. Reg. 55,488 (1976).
142. SeeProposed Rules §§ 801.10, 801.15, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,490-91 (1976) (to be codified in
16 C.F.R. pt. 801) (notification required for the merger of a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corpo-
ration with a foreign business).
143. Seenotes 50-59 supra and accompanying text.
144. See generall, Baker, To Indict or Not to Indict: Prosecutorial Discretion in Sherman
Act Enforcement, 63 CORNELL L. Rav. 405 (1978).
145. See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, tits.
I, II, 90 Stat. 1383 (amending scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1976)).
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(3) Be sensitive and restrained in using inflammatory "criminal" law
enforcement tools, such as border watches.' 46 These tend to cause consider-
able consternation in Canada--out of proportion to what they achieve.
(4) Recognize that other countries' systems of administration are
often less formal than their American counterparts. We should look at least
in part to the foreign state's normal practice in dealing with the issue of
whether the foreign state as sovereign has in fact "commanded" or "for-
mally approved" any anticompetitive conduct under investigation. 147
(5) Recognize formal approval by a foreign government as a basis for
U.S. antitrust immunity where: (a) a major foreign state policy is at stake;
and (b) the action is not primarily aimed at and does not have a significant
impact upon the U.S. import market.
(6) Neither treat informal encouragement by foreign officials as the
basis for antitrust immunity,148 nor charge such foreign officials as co-
146. See generally Leahy, Border Patrol Checkpoint Operation under Warrants of Inspec-
tion: 7he Wake of Alrmeida-Sanchez v. United States, 5 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 62 (1974).
147. For example, in Surety Title Ins. Agency v. Virginia State Bar, [1978] 1 Trade Cas.
61,897 (4th Cir. Mar. 1, 1978), the court of appeals stayed consideration of a "state action"
antitrust case, in order to give the highest court of the state the opportunity to clarify exactly
what the state's role was under state law. In some instances this type of procedure might be
appropriate in the foreign realm.
148. This point represents the heart of my difference with Mr. Stanford. He essentially opts
for a world of diplomacy and informal government initiative-views that are altogether ap-
propriate for a distinguished civil servant and diplomat in a well-governed society. I essentially
opt for a rule of law in which courts do play a central role and do allow necessities (but not
preferences) of states to influence judicial decisions-a view that is appropriate both to a citi-
zen of a republic in which the judiciary has proven to be the key check on bureaucratic
excesses and to a lawyer who has spent the larger part of his professional life enforcing a key
body of law having great potential flexibility.
Mr. Stanford essentially says two things. First, "[tihe effective functioning of [the] business-
government relationship requires more than a government that is sensitive to the concerns of
the private sector;, it also requires a private sector that is responsive to the policies of govern-
ment and will generally conform to those policies without having to be threatened with prose-
cution, fines, and imprisonment. Effective management of a complex industrial economy
cannot rest upon legislated sanctions alone." Stanford, supra note 3, at 198. He adds to this
point that "both the Government and the private sector may prefer to avoid the formality and
rigidity of legislation, and compliance with policy may instead be secured through discussions
and voluntary action permitted, but not compelled, by domestic law." Id at 212. Second, when
one government seeks to encourage private action that is harmful to the government or econ-
omy of another state, "it is inappropriate for ... [the latter government] to seek to impose its
desired solution by invoking its domestic law before its tribunals to adjudicate the legality of
conduct in another jurisdiction. The difference should be resolved, as are other intergovern-
mental differences, by consultation and negotiation." Id at 201.
Mr. Stanford's "bottom line" is this: if two governments have some interest in something, it
is suddenly taken out of the judicial channels which are so central, at least to the American
system, and is thrust into the vaguer world of diplomacy. His practical message to potential
private cartel members is thus: "If we can somehow get a foreign government interested in this
matter-however informally-we can do whatever we want, however injurious it is to the U.S.
economy, and however flagrantly it violates the fundamental policies of the U.S. antitrust
laws." Of course, the foreign government and the potential private cartel members would pre-
fer an informal route, simply to avoid publicity, a point strikingly brought home in the Cana-
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conspirators on the basis of such encouragement. When domestic govern-
ment officials are involved, they can be more easily assumed to have some
knowledge of U.S. antitrust laws, and it is less alarming to allow them to be
charged as co-conspirators when they have plainly exceeded their official
duties. 149 Bringing antitrust charges against foreign officials causes great
public consternation and little, if any, gain to U.S. antitrust enforcement.
(7) Apply U.S. antitrust laws to "commercial" enterprises owned by
foreign sovereigns where such foreign enterprises are operating in the
United States or between the United States and foreign countries. For rea-
sons of comity, the United States should not apply its antitrust laws to
"commercial" activities by foreign state enterprises carried on overseas, un-
less the activity is primarily aimed at or has an impact upon the U.S. mar-
ket. In other words, the United States should treat foreign state enterprises
as engaged in conduct involving important state policies, as mentioned in
paragraph (5) above.
(8) Eliminate overlapping antitrust enforcement jurisdiction between
the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice in the inter-
national trade area.150 The "independent" commissions--of which the Fed-
eral Trade Commission is one-are hard for foreigners to understand,
especially when they are out of the day-to-day control of those responsible
for the foreign policy of the United States. By contrast, in the airline field,
international orders of the "independent" Civil Aeronautics Board are sub-
ject to review and setting aside by the President. Antitrust can be diplomati-
cally sensitive. Therefore, it is highly desirable to have antitrust
enforcement in the hands of an executive agency directly responsible to the
President, who is in turn responsible for conducting foreign policy. Most
U.S. international antitrust enforcement is already being done by the De-
partment of Justice. Formalizing this role would nevertheless eliminate lin-
gering uncertainties in the private sector.
dian uranium investigation. Bureaucrats usually prefer private informal solutions to legislated
ones, simply because such private informal arrangements are less subject not only to judicial
checks but also to the ultimate checks of the democratic process. As a lawyer and democrat, I
have a strong preference for policies that compel a state to take action as a sovereign and to
command what the bureaucrats and the potential cartel members privately believe to be in the
national interest. For example, in the uranium situation it does not seem clear beyond doubt
that, if the Canadian public had known what was going on, the Parliament in Ottawa would
indeed have mandated what the bureaucrats and the private firms thought was desirable.
149. Cf Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Ariz., 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964) (refusing to
dismiss a cause of action based on allegations that defendant conspired with and submitted
false information to the state attorney general, who placed a savings and loan institution into
receivership).
150. Some have advocated that all antitrust enforcement responsibility, not just interna-
tional matters, be consolidated into a single federal agency. Eg., Oversighl of Antitrust
Enforcement, supra note 11, at 627 (prepared statement of Dean Ernest Gellhorn).
ANTITRUST CONFLICTS
(9) Realize that protectionism invites "cartelization" as a response.
Therefore, the Attorney General and the Antitrust Division, as champions
of competitive policy, should take an even more active role in analyzing
and, when appropriate, opposing measures offered by other government or-
ganizations to protect parts of the U.S. economy from international compe-
tition. The newspaper stories15 ' make clear that the foreign government
interest in the uranium cartel-which is very much at the heart of today's
problem-was spurred by quite protectionist uranium policies and embar-
goes mandated by the U.S. Congress152 and the U.S. Atomic Energy Com-
mission. 153
B. PRACTICAL ADVICE TO CANADA
I would recommend that Canada do the following things:
(1) Be more consumer minded. Go the extraterritorial route in deal-
ing with foreign arrangements that have a substantial impact in Canada.
This is well within the bounds of modern international law and is a politi-
cally sensible course for a government dedicated to protecting its consum-
ers.
(2) To that end, prosecute U.S. Webb-Pomerene associations 154
whose activities have a substantial adverse impact on Canadian markets. In
other words, put the United States to the test: does it really believe in extra-
territoriality? I think that it does!
(3) If you are going to cartelize, do it like the Arabs. Have the gov-
ernment carry on the cartel activities openly and clearly, exercising central
responsibility. This has the competitive virtue of putting the government
squarely on the line politically, thereby giving its own media and consum-
ing public an opportunity to be heard on these subjects. 155
(4) Use formal government powers where the government seeks to
encourage private firms to form cartels in a field where the United States is
151. See, e.g., The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Sept. 30, 1977, at 2, cols. 2-3.
152. See42 U.S.C. § 2201(v)(B) (1976).
153. See 10 C.F.R. §§ 40.1-.90 (1977) (licensing of source materials); id §§ 50.1-.110 (li-
censing of production and utilization facilities); id §§ 70.1-.71 (licensing of special nuclear
material). The Atomic Energy Commission is now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
154. The Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1976) provides a limited exemption
from antitrust liability:
Nothing contained in [the Sherman Act] shall be construed as declaring to be illegal
an association entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in export trade and actu-
ally engaged solely in such export trade, or an agreement made or act done in the
course of export trade by such association, provided such association, agreement, or
act is not in restraint of trade within the United States, and is not in restraint of the
export trade of any domestic competitor of such association ....
Id § 62.
155. See, e.g., The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Sept. 30, 1977, at 1, col. 1.
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a substantial buyer. It is much better to exercise formal powers at the outset
than to prevent investigation after the event.
(5) Be more sensitive and selective in dealing with the document dis-
covery issue. It is one thing for the government to say that it needs to screen
documents before they go abroad to make sure that no sensitive state inter-
est is at stake. It is an entirely different matter to erect a total bar to discov-
ery of all private documents. That looks unduly familiar-and
unnecessarily abrasive-to a neighboring country that has just been
through the Watergate saga and whose press and public are extraordinarily
suspicious of bureaucratic "coverups" at high levels in government.
C. PRAcTIcAL ADVICE TO BOTH COUNTRIES
We should remember the common values that unite us. We both have
a fundamental commitment to democratic government under law. We both
have an interest in producer efficiency and consumer welfare. In the long
run, these interests, both political and economic, are likely to be better
served by relying primarily on markets working back and forth across our
common borders. Cooperation in making these markets work and in anti-
trust enforcement is greatly to be preferred to competition in erecting spe-
cial interest barriers and cartels. We have too much in common-and too
much at stake-not to try harder to do better.
